Florida State University Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 2 Winter 2017

Article 8

Winter 2017

Marriage Equality: The Paralleled Progress between Public
Approval and Supreme Court Decisionmaking
Riley Erin Fredrick

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Riley E. Fredrick, Marriage Equality: The Paralleled Progress between Public Approval and Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 819 (2018) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol44/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

MARRIAGE EQUALITY: THE PARALLELED PROGRESS
BETWEEN PUBLIC APPROVAL AND SUPREME
COURT DECISIONMAKING
RILEY ERIN FREDRICK *
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................
II. THEORETICAL MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING ....................................
A. Legal Model ...............................................................................................
B. Attitudinal Model ......................................................................................
C. Attitudinal Change Model .........................................................................
D. Strategic Behavior Model ..........................................................................
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE TIMELINE: PUBLIC OPINION AND COINCIDING CASES ....
A. Burger Court (1969 – 1986): Bowers .........................................................
B. Rehnquist Court (1986 – 2005): Romer & Lawrence ................................
C. Roberts Court (2005-Present): Windsor, Hollingsworth, & Obergefell ....
IV. APPLYING A MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING TO THE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE CASES ..............................................................................................
A. The Attitudinal Model “Plus” ....................................................................
B. Revisiting the Legal Model and Strategic Behavior Model ......................
V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................

819
822
822
823
825
826
827
827
830
835
841
842
847
849

I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion is
a historically significant one. The Court’s institutional differences
from the other two branches of government place it in a unique position when it comes to the importance of public support and approval.
On one hand, the Justices are unelected, serve life terms, and are generally unanswerable to the public.1 The Court also lacks the power to
enforce its own decisions. 2 In theory, these aspects insulate it from
public pressure. Thus, because the Court is not electorally accountable, societal influences and public opinion should play little role in its
decisionmaking. However, the opposite seems to be the case. 3 The

* J.D., Florida State University College of Law (2017). First, I would like to thank
Professor Tahirih V. Lee for immediately recognizing the potential in me before I could see
it in myself. I truly cannot thank you enough for your continued guidance and encouragement, as I might not be where I am today without it. I would also like to thank all of my
friends, family, and classmates who supported me throughout this process. Finally, thank
you Florida State University Law Review for making all of this possible.
1. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of
Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013).
2. Id.
3. See id. (“[S]cholars and commentators agree that it is crucial for the Court to maintain a reputation from the public as impartial, trustworthy, and above the politics and bargaining characterizing Congress and the presidency.”).
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Court’s institutional differences from the other branches of government are exactly why public opinion is so important in retaining its legitimacy and more importantly, its functionality as an institution.4
The question that has dominated legal and political science discourse for the past decade is, to what extent can and do courts “make
policy decisions by going outside established ‘legal’ criteria found in
precedent, statute, and constitution[?]”5 This is where the Court’s reliance on ‘non-legal’ principles, such as ideological preferences and
public opinion, come into the analysis. The first step in establishing a
relationship between the Court’s decisionmaking and public influence
is to understand the relationship between the Court and public opinion
itself. Again, institutional capacities, or lack thereof, are the driving
force behind the Court’s need for public approval. It may even be said
that the Court’s decisions will only have their full effects when popular
opinion supports them.6 Thus, considering the Court strictly “a legal
institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political system.” 7 It is also a political institution in that it issues decisions
on controversial questions of national policy. 8
Often times, Supreme Court constitutional interpretation “can intersect social reform movements at various points in their evolution.” 9
Less frequently, however, the Court issues a landmark decision that
would have been constitutionally inconceivable just a decade or two
earlier. While “[s]ocial and political change can render previously inconceivable Court decisions conceivable. . . . such change does not necessarily make those rulings inevitable.” 10 Multiple factors, such as legal precedent, historical background, ideological preferences, and public opinion, affect judicial decisionmaking too. This Note is not the first,
nor will it be the last, to analyze the complex multitude of reasons behind Supreme Court decisionmaking, particularly for the presence of
‘non-legal’ influences.
My job today is to explore the connection between public opinion,
societal progress, and Supreme Court decisionmaking. Specifically,
4. Neil Malhotra & Stephen A. Jessee, Ideological Proximity and Support for the Supreme Court, 36 POL. BEHAV. 817, 818 (2013).
5. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-80 (1957).
6. Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1023
(2004).
7. Dahl, supra note 5, at 279.
8. Id.
9. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at ix (2013).
10. Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 135 (2013).
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and unlike anyone else, my focus is on the journey to legal recognition
of same-sex marriage, which has undoubtedly been one of the most
socially, politically, and legally contentious issues in the United States.
The dramatic changes in social and political attitudes about both gay
rights generally and same-sex marriage over the past three decades are
truly remarkable. For that reason, same-sex marriage makes for a compelling test subject when looking at the relationship between public
opinion and judicial decisionmaking. Ultimately, I find that the attitudinal model best explains the outcomes of the same-sex marriage cases,
and the attitudinal change model provides a more complete explanation
for how and why the Court progressed from its Bowers 11 decision in
1986 to the monumental Obergefell 12 decision in 2015.
Part II of this Note discusses four behavioral models that have
guided scholars’ approach to analyzing and empirically studying judicial decisionmaking. The legal model is based on a formalist view of
the law, which calls for legal analysis through strict adherence to common law precedents or statutory texts and is devoid of any expression
of judicial ideology.13 The attitudinal model assumed prominence in Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth’s The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.14 This model is based on the simple theory that “judges
make result-oriented decisions, based primarily upon their ideologies.”15
The attitudinal change model suggests that external social and political
forces, rather than internal forces (e.g., ideology), influence decisionmaking based on the hypothesis that judges are influenced by the
same social forces that sway public opinion.16 Finally, the strategic behavior model is based on rational choice institutionalism, which
emerged when Lee Epstein and Jack Knight empirically assessed Walter F. Murphy’s argument in The Elements of Judicial Strategy. 17
Part III is a historical account of the gay rights movement in the
United States. It lays out a same-sex marriage timeline, tracking the
gradual change in public opinion that paralleled Supreme Court progress. Finally, Part IV chooses the attitudinal model and the attitudinal change model, to create what I term the “attitudinal model ‘plus’ ”
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 254-55 (1997).
14. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Glendon Schubert, David Rohde, and Harold Spaeth developed
the attitudinal model. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED].
15. Cross, supra note 13, at 266.
16. Isaac Unah et al., U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL.
293, 300 (2015).
17. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
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as the best explanation of the Court’s decisionmaking in the same-sex
marriage cases. Further, it demonstrates how the same social forces
that influenced the gradual public approval of same-sex marriage, similarly influenced the Court overtime.
II. THEORETICAL MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Several theoretical models seek to explain judicial decisionmaking.
There are three main models of judicial behavior generally depicted in
scholarship: legal, attitudinal, and strategic. 18 Each of the models
stand for different hypotheses on how judges make decisions. Specifically, I will explore four models, the legal model; the attitudinal model;
the attitudinal change model; and the strategic behavior model, detailing their diverse contributions to the scholarship on judicial behavior.
In Part IV, I will come back to these models in light of the same-sex
marriage timeline and cases described in Part III to draw a conclusion.

A. Legal Model
The legal model is a traditional, formalist theory that portrays the
judge “as one who objectively and impersonally decides cases by logically deducing the correct resolution from a definite and consistent
body of legal rules.” 19 This model demands that judicial decisionmaking be objective and impartial.20 Further, it calls for pure legal reasoning, devoid of any expression of judicial individuality or ideology. 21 It
hypothesizes that judges only want to interpret the law and thus,
“choose between alternative case outcomes and doctrinal positions on
the basis of their legal merits.” 22 Thus, “judge[s do] not make
law . . . [but simply] appl[y] the law that [was] created by the legislature or [is] inherent in the common law.” 23 This model reflects the traditional view that law and politics should and do remain separate.
However, since the legal realist movement, scholars no longer fully
accept the legal model’s explanation of judicial behavior. 24 The legal

18. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 5 (2006).
19. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 87
(1995) (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24-25
(1960); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-75 (1973)).
20. Id.
21. Cross, supra note 13, at 255.
22. BAUM, supra note 18, at 5.
23. Hasnas, supra note 19, at 87.
24. BAUM, supra note 18, at 8.
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model has largely been abandoned and disproven in recent years.25 Instead, a complex multitude of factors, including legal, ideological, and
strategic elements are suggested to drive judicial decisionmaking. 26
Strict reliance on precedent without any ideological principles coming
into play may no longer be a realistic assessment of judicial decisionmaking, and “legal scholars have implicitly accepted the use of precedent at face value.”27 More cynically, adherence to the legal model “may
simply be a convenient fiction for judges, lawyers, professors, and others.” 28 Although the legal model may no longer accurately reflect the
prevailing view of scholars, judicial decisionmaking is also not exclusively result-oriented, as the reliance on precedent, statute, and constitution still pervades and restrains the vast majority of legal writing.

B. Attitudinal Model
“The attitudinal model is [perhaps] the bedrock theoretical principle of legal realists” and one of the leading theories when it comes to
explaining judicial decisionmaking.29 This theory, advanced by Jeffrey
A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, materialized in the legal realist movement of the 1920’s, which was led by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome
Frank, among others. 30 The legal realist movement challenged the
classical view of legal formalism. As described above, the premise of
the legal model was inspired by legal formalism and posited that a
“judge’s techniques were socially neutral, his private views
irrelevant . . . [and that] judging was more like finding than making,
a matter of necessity rather than choice.” 31 Legal realists rejected the
theory that judges do not make law because judging inherently creates
law. 32 According to Jerome Frank:
Even in a relatively static society, men have never been able to construct a comprehensive, externalized set of rules anticipating all possible legal disputes and settling them in advance. Even in such a social
order no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations
of events; situations are bound to occur which were never contemplated
25. Cross, supra note 13, at 255 (“The formalist [legal] model held sway for a long time, but
most contemporary scholars no longer adhere to the strict determinate formalist [legal] model.”).
26. Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 72 (2014).
27. Cross, supra note 13, at 260.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case
Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 L. & POL’Y 295, 296 (2006).
30. SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 86-87.
31. Id. (citing Yosal Rogat, Legal Realism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 420
(Paul Edwards, ed., 1972)).
32. Id. at 87.
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when the original rules were made. How much less is such a frozen
legal system possible in modern times. . . . Our society would be
straight-jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of
ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions. 33

Thus, legal realism is where “[t]he attitudinal model ha[d] its genesis,”
but the model also incorporates key concepts from psychology, political
science, and economics. 34
The simple hypothesis of the attitudinal model is that judges come
to the court “with their ideological preferences fully formed and, in
light of contextual case facts, these preferences cast overwhelming influence on their decision making.” 35 Accordingly, judicial decisionmaking is result-oriented here because it is based primarily on the judge’s
ideologies. 36 More specifically, the attitudinal model suggests Supreme
Court Justices have more power to freely implement their personal
policy preferences than other judges. 37 The Justices have life-tenured
positions, no electoral accountability, and comprise a court of last resort that controls its own docket, giving them enormous power to let
their own ideologies influence decisionmaking. 38
However, there are “[t]wo fundamental assumptions [that] underlie
the . . . attitudinal model”: (1) “individual attitudes are assumed to be
the primary determinants of behavior (i.e., decisions)” and (2) “individual attitudes are considered fundamental and enduring.” 39 Thus, “Justices vote the way they do . . . because this is who they are and who
they are likely to remain.” 40 Based on this model, each Justice’s vote is
determined solely by his or her ideology. For example, “Rehnquist
vote[d] the way he [did] because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.” 41 Moreover,
the attitudinal model assumes the Justices have fixed ideological preferences that are enduring throughout their time on the bench. 42 While

Id. at 88 (citing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 5-7 (1949)).
Id. at 87.
Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 296 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14).
Cross, supra note 13, at 266.
SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 110.
SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 92.
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 171 (1996).
40. Id.
41. Lee Epstein et al., Review Essays, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 587-88 (2001).
42. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 39, at 171.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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this might be a slight oversimplification for explaining judicial behavior, the attitudinal model has been widely tested under various conditions, with strong evidence supporting it. 43

C. Attitudinal Change Model
Although they share a common name, the attitudinal model and the
attitudinal change model do have significant differences. While the attitudinal model suggests internal forces (such as a judge’s ideological
preferences and values) influence vote choice, the attitudinal change
model suggests external social and political forces influence decisionmaking.44 More specifically, the attitudinal change model rests on
the idea that judges are “influenced by the same social forces that sway
public opinion” rather than being influenced directly by public opinion.45 Because judges are still members of society, social forces influence their beliefs in the same way they influence the rest of the
American public.46
The sentiment of the attitudinal change model has not only been
advanced by scholars, but by Supreme Court Justices themselves. Addressing the question of whether “judges [are] influenced by public
opinion,” former Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “I think it would be
very wrong to say that judges are not influenced by public opinion.
Indeed, I think it is all but impossible to conceive of judges who are in
any respect normal human beings who are not affected by public opinion in this way.” 47 He further explained the effect of public opinion,
specifically in regards to the salient constitutional questions:
“Great” constitutional cases often derive their “greatness” from the
very fact that they involve broad jurisprudential themes, rather
than simply the nuts and bolts of the law, and are therefore more
likely to be affected by tides of public opinion already running in the
country. Secondly, important constitutional litigation can generate
its own tides of public opinion, just as a large ship causes a considerable wake, and these more immediate tides may also affect the
decision of the case. 48

Chief Justice Rehnquist championed the attitudinal change model’s
theory that the nexus between public opinion and judicial decisionmaking “arises from the force of mutually experienced events
43. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 296-97.
44. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 300 n.28.
45. Id. at 300.
46. Id.
47. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 751, 752 (1986).
48. Id. at 768.
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and ideas in shaping and reshaping the preferences of both the
public and the [J]ustices.” 49

D. Strategic Behavior Model
The strategic behavior model is another popular theory advanced
in judicial decisionmaking scholarship. The theory postulates that the
Supreme Court “directly and deliberately follows public opinion for
fear of losing its legitimacy as an institution.”50 This model is rooted in
the belief that the Justices modify their behavior to strategically align
with public opinion to protect the Court’s legitimacy and promote policy effectiveness. 51 Public opinion serves as an active constraint on the
Justices’ preferences here. 52 Because the Court does not have the
power to enforce its own decisions, “it cannot stray too far from public
opinion.” 53 Thus, the Court would risk losing both the public’s confidence and its institutional legitimacy if it consistently voted contrary
to public opinion.54
Much like the attitudinal change model, the sentiment of the strategic behavior model has also been echoed among Supreme Court Justices. Most notably, Justice Frankfurter spoke out in regard to the
Court maintaining societal acceptance. He stated, “[t]o a large
extent, . . . the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation of words whose contents are derived from the disposition of
the Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing,
the general drift of public opinion.” 55 He reiterated this notion in his
dissent in Baker v. Carr, stating, “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed
of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.” 56 In another landmark case,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice O’Connor similarly reasoned,
49. Michael W. Giles et al., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling
the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 295
(2008); see also Rehnquist, supra note 47, at 768-69 (“This is not a case of judges ‘knuckling
under’ to public opinion, and cravenly abandoning their oaths of office. Judges . . . can no
more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at
other jobs. In addition, if a judge on coming to the bench were to decide to seal himself off
hermetically from all manifestations of public opinion, he would accomplish very little; he
would not be influenced by current public opinion, but instead would be influenced by the
state of public opinion at the time he came to the bench.”).
50. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 299.
51. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295.
52. Id.
53. Malhotra & Jessee, supra note 4, at 820.
54. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 299.
55. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 6, at 1022 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAW AND
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1939, 197 (eds. Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Prichard, Jr., 1939).
56. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962).
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“[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare
what it demands.” 57 While the Court is not electorally accountable, it
is nonetheless important for the Court to stay somewhat in line with
public opinion in order to retain its legitimacy. All four of these models
will provide solid frameworks for analyzing the relationship between
public opinion and Supreme Court decisionmaking regarding gay
rights and same-sex marriage, as described in Part III.
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE TIMELINE: PUBLIC OPINION AND
COINCIDING CASES
Same-sex marriage makes for such a compelling test subject when
studying the relationship between public opinion and judicial decisionmaking because of the dramatic change in social and political attitudes in the past three decades. Striking down a federal statute that
defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman was
not constitutionally plausible just twenty years ago. 58 Even by the mid1990s, not a single country in the world legally recognized same-sex
marriage. 59 The timeline of the gradual public approval of same-sex
marriage, as analyzed with the coinciding Supreme Court cases on the
issue, provide a telling story of the relationship between public opinion
and judicial decisionmaking in this context.

A. Burger Court (1969 – 1986): Bowers
The recognition of any gay rights, much less the legalization of
same-sex marriage, was not a topic of serious discussion in the United
States during the 1960s.60 There was no right to privacy, as every state
criminalized private, consensual sex between same-sex partners. 61
Federal, state, and local governments treated alleged homosexuality
as sufficient grounds for dismissal.62Further, “[h]omosexual acts were
deemed unprofessional conduct sufficient to deny or revoke a license
to practice medicine, law, or nursing.” 63 In the early 1960s, there were

57.
58.
59.
60.

505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
Klarman, supra note 10, at 155.
Id. at 130.
See KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 3-6; Richard Wolf, Timeline: Same-sex Marriage
Through the Years, USA TODAY (June 26, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2015/06/24/same-sex-marriage-timeline/29173703/ [https://perma.cc/
2GGN-W8SU].
61. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 3.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id.
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approximately 3,000 military discharges a year based on alleged homosexuality.64 Because there were serious implications associated with being publicly identified as gay, gay rights organizations had to be extremely secretive, thus, limiting the influence they could exercise in society. 65 Further, a 1969 opinion poll reported that sixty-three percent of
respondents considered homosexuals “harmful to American life.” 66
Despite the stagnant progress made during the 1960s, the 1970s
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of gay activists and gay
rights organizations. 67 From a mere fifty gay rights organizations in
1969 to eight hundred organizations in 1973, the gay rights movement
was finally getting a public voice. 68 As such, same-sex couples started
applying for marriage licenses for the first time in 1971 and subsequently filing suit when their state refused to recognize their marriages as valid.69 State courts decisively rejected any and all legal arguments made for the recognition of same-sex marriage. 70 These casual dismissals were not shocking because “[c]ourts almost never vindicate constitutional claims that strongly contravene public opinion.” 71
In the 1970s, same-sex marriage had so little support that there were
no polls that surveyed public opinion on the issue.72
By 1985, only twenty-five percent of Americans reported having a
gay friend, coworker, or relative. 73 Further, it was not until 1986 that
the American Civil Liberties Union formally endorsed same-sex marriage.74 Similarly, in 1986, when the Supreme Court was deciding a
same-sex sodomy issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, 75 Justice Powell discussed the case with his (gay) law clerk and remarked that he had
never known a gay person. 76 The issue in Bowers was whether the
Constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” 77 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found
the Georgia statute which criminalized consensual sodomy violated
Hardwick’s right to privacy protected by the Ninth Amendment and
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Klarman, supra note 10, at 132.

Id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 37.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
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under the “notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 78
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that there was no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, despite the fact that
the Georgia statute made no distinction between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.79 The majority stated it was unwilling to take an expansive view of its authority and “discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.”80 It reasoned that “[t]he Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution.”81 Finally, the majority stated
that sodomy laws are grounded in notions of morality “and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”82
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority’s “obsessive
focus on homosexual activity . . . in light of the broad language Georgia
has used.” 83 He reasoned that the issue here involved an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, which had no bearing on Hardwick’s sexual
orientation.84 He went even further to say that, “[u]nlike the Court, the
Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of
those other citizens.” 85
This decision even came under criticism from some of the mainstream press. In an article for the Los Angeles Times, John Rechy
opined that “[n]ot since the Supreme Court declared in the Dred Scott
case that slavery was legal and blacks were not citizens has there been
a high court ruling as seeped in prejudice as this one.” 86 However, the
criticism was not unanimous among the nation, as only thirty-three
percent of Americans supported legalizing sodomy.87 In addition, Bow-

78. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)).
79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 194.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 196.
83. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 338-39 (2009).
87. Id. at 359.
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ers “was decided at the height of public hysteria about the AIDS epidemic. . . . [as] almost a majority [of Americans] supported quarantining AIDS victims.” 88
B. Rehnquist Court (1986 – 2005): Romer & Lawrence
By the time the next gay rights case came to the Supreme Court,
there were major compositional changes. Only Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Stevens, who decided Bowers, remained on the Court. New to the Court were Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The Court’s composition is of the utmost importance because a single vote switch can drastically change the direction of national policy. At this time, there was
still not a single country in the world that legalized same-sex marriage.89 However, most economically developed countries started seeing a change in the meaning of marriage, specifically that marriage
“became less about childbearing . . . [and] more about mutual commitment and nurturing happiness.” 90 Same-sex couples could just as easily pursue these objectives of marriage as opposite-sex couples, facilitating some support to expand the definition of marriage to include
same-sex couples.91
Significantly, 1996 was a defining year for same-sex marriage progress. The Supreme Court issued what was the first major win for gay
right supporters in Romer v. Evans.92 In the early 1990s, several Colorado cities “enacted ordinances forbidding discrimination based on
sexual orientation.” 93 In response, Colorado amended their state constitution (“Amendment 2”) both to repeal these ordinances and to “prohibit all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect” the civil rights of gay people.94
The Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2, holding it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 95
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that Amendment 2 “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of
88. Id.
89. See David Masci et al., Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26,
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013 (illustrating that no nations had legalized same-sex marriage by 1986).
90. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 52.
91. Id. at 51.
92. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
93. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 68.
94. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
95. Id. at 635-36.
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persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.” 96 Further, he noted that a law,
which makes it more difficult for a single group of citizens than for all
others to seek assistance from the government, is a denial of equal
protection “in the most literal sense.” 97 Additionally, the Court found
no legitimate governmental purpose in enacting Amendment 2. 98
The three dissenters in Romer, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Thomas, criticized the majority’s “heavy reliance upon principles of
righteousness rather than judicial holdings”99 as having “no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretend[ing] to.” 100
Justice Scalia also stated the judiciary, as opposed to the political
branches, had no business taking a side in “this culture war.” 101 This
would hardly be the last word, or dissent, that Justice Scalia would
author on the topic. Thus, while Romer “was a narrow decision with
limited implications,” it was nonetheless a significant victory for the
gay rights movement. 102
Just when Romer reflected a win, the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) 103 stood in resistance to that progress. The two main purposes of DOMA were “to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. . . . [and] to protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex
unions.” 104 Governing state choice-of-law cases, DOMA stated:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as
a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession,
or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 105

Thus, states were not “required to give full faith and credit to any law
or judicial decision of another state recognizing same-sex marriage.”106

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 653.
Id. at 652.
KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 69.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
§ 1738C.
KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis removed).
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For the purposes of federal law, DOMA defined marriage solely as the
union between a man and a woman. 107
After the Romer decision and President Clinton announced his intentions to sign DOMA, the Washington Post declared, “[s]ame-sex
marriage has suddenly become the most visible issue in the gay rights
debate.” 108 In 1996, DOMA passed by huge margins in both houses of
Congress. 109 The House passed DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67 and the
Senate passed it by 85 to 14. 110 President Clinton kept a low profile,
signing DOMA after midnight and without public ceremony. 111 Mike
McCurry, President Clinton’s press secretary, later recalled “[h]is posture was quite frankly driven by the political realities of an election
year in 1996.”112
By 2000, there was still not a single country in the world that had
legalized same-sex marriage. 113 Although same-sex marriage was still
an enormously controversial topic, consensual same-sex sodomy no
longer was.114 Gay rights organizations worked towards the repeal of
sodomy laws by litigation in state courts and lobbying state legislatures.115 Their efforts paid off: by 2003, only four states still criminalized consensual sodomy and specifically targeted same-sex couples,
compared to half of the states criminalizing same-sex sodomy at the
time Bowers was decided in 1986.116 Further, states that did still have
sodomy laws commonly did not enforce them against consenting adults
acting in private. 117

107. David Masci, An Overview of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr.
1, 2008), http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/04/01/an-overview-of-the-samesex-marriagedebate/ [https://perma.cc/55QX-3S8B].
108. Barbara Vobejda, Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Political Issue, WASH. POST (May
23, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/05/23/same-sex-marriage-becomes-political-issue/7c4c8c57-c2dc-47fa-b0f1-9ef82ab7c69b/ [http://perma.cc/2VDL-9YFQ].
109. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 921, 970 (1998).
110. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 63.
111. Id.
112. Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/us/politics/bill-clintons-decision-and-regreton-defense-of-marriage-act.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/EV5B-22RJ].
113. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 83.
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (“In our own constitutional
system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision
are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct.”).
117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
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In March of 2003, the constitutionality of same-sex sodomy laws
came directly before the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. 118 Writing for the majority once again, Justice Kennedy emphasized that
Bowers’ holding that there was no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy 119 needed to be reexamined. 120 He stated, “Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”121
Further, its “continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.” 122 The Court found that the decisions consenting adults
make in the privacy of their homes “are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and a State’s
view that same-sex sodomy is immoral is not sufficient grounds to uphold a law prohibiting it.123 Nor did the Court find any legitimate state
interest to justify this invasion of privacy.124
As Justice Kennedy noted in his opinion, the foundations of Bowers
seriously eroded in the seventeen years between when it was decided
and when Lawrence overruled it. 125 In 1986, fifty-seven percent of
Americans believed same-sex relations between consenting adults
should not be legal and only thirty-two percent believed it should be
legal.126 By 2003, only thirty-five percent of Americans believed samesex relations between consenting adults should not be legal and sixty
percent believed it should be legal.127 Thus, overruling Bowers in Lawrence was a somewhat easy decision for the Court “in the sense that it
simply involved translating into constitutional law a social norm that
already commanded overwhelming popular support.” 128
Despite the seemingly uncontroversial holding of Lawrence, its undeniable connection with same-sex marriage made it a salient issue.129

118. Id. at 558.
119. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
121. Id. at 578.
122. Id. at 575.
123. Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Justice
O’Connor concurred in Lawrence but did not join the Court in overruling Bowers. Id. at 579
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Further, she found the Texas statute unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. Id.
124. Id. at 578.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on the Morality of Homosexuality, GALLUP
(June 18, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/americans-evenly-divided-moralityhomosexuality.aspx [https://perma.cc/PKS7-YA25].
127. Id.
128. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 86.
129. Id.
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The day after the Court issued its decision, there were nearly fifty stories on gay marriage in major U.S. newspapers. 130 Justice Scalia noted
this connection in his Lawrence dissent, stating “[t]his case ‘does not
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of
this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us,
this is so.” 131 Gay rights activists immediately echoed Scalia’s view of
Lawrence’s implications, believing that same-sex marriage would be
next. 132 However, support for the legalization of same-sex relations fell
from sixty percent to fifty percent in the month following the Lawrence
decision, perhaps because of its connection with same-sex marriage.133
Nonetheless, just a few months later in November of 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that barring same-sex couples “from
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage” was a violation of the Massachusetts Constitution. 134 The court reasoned that
“[w]hether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and
whether and how to establish a family . . . are among the most basic of
every individual’s liberty and due process rights.” 135 Thus, Massachusetts “became only the fifth jurisdiction in the world to allow gay marriage. [And] [t]he others—Ontario, British Columbia, Belgium, and the
Netherlands—had all enacted gay marriage only within the [previous]
two years.” 136
Immediately following this decision, several cities began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, while thirteen states amended
their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. 137 By 2004, the
number of newspaper articles reporting on gay marriage was ten times
higher than what it had been in 2000. 138 Further, during the 2004 election, forty-one percent of voters viewed same-sex marriage as an important issue and twenty-four percent reported they would vote only
for candidates that shared their views on the subject. 139 At this time,

130. Nathaniel Persily, Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts 19 (April 29, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania Law School), faculty scholarship
paper 91, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=
faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/QB54-SFCM].
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 87.
133. Saad, supra note 126.
134. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
135. Id. at 959.
136. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 90-91.
137. Masci, supra note 107.
138. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 97.
139. Id. at 103-04.
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forty-two percent of Americans supported same-sex marriage legalization and fifty-five percent opposed it. 140 During the Rehnquist Court
era, same-sex marriage became solidified as a pressing social issue
throughout the United States.

C. Roberts Court (2005-Present): Windsor, Hollingsworth, & Obergefell
Just like the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court era experienced
several compositional changes. In 2005 and 2006, President Bush appointed John Roberts to replace the former Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Samuel Alito to replace Justice O’Connor.141 Adding Alito to the
bench was “expected to tilt the balance of the court to the right on matters like abortion, affirmative action, and the death penalty . . . [which]
partisans on each side said the outcome would echo through American
politics for decades.” 142 By 2008, the United States proved to be getting
more progressive in terms of gay rights. Fifteen states provided health
care benefits to same-sex partners of public employees, as compared to
zero states in 1993. 143 Twenty states had anti-discrimination laws that
covered sexual orientation. 144 And finally, thirty-two states authorized
additional punishments for hate crimes motivated by anti-gay sentiments.145 Working towards marriage, several states enacted domestic
partnership or civil union laws.
In 2009, support for same-sex marriage among Americans was up
to forty percent. 146 In the same year, President Obama made his first
Supreme Court appointment, nominating Sonia Sotomayor to replace
Justice Souter.147 Some conservatives criticized her as being “a liberal
judicial activist of the first order who thinks her own personal political
agenda is more important [than] the law as written.” 148 Her critics also
pointed to “a panel discussion at Duke University in 2005, where she
told students that the federal Court of Appeals is where ‘policy is

140. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, GALLUP
(May 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/majority-americans-continue-opposegay-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/C8P3-NGSC].
141. FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 368-69.
142. Id. (quoting David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives
Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/politics/politicsspecial1/
01confirm.html [https://perma.cc/RY6W-P3VR]).
143. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 119.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Jones, supra note 140.
147. Peter Hambly et al., Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to Supreme Court,
CNN (May 26, 2009, 8:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/supreme.court/
[https://perma.cc/PZ2A-8YFT].
148. Id.
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made.’ ” 149 Approximately one year later, President Obama made a second appointment, nominating Elena Kagan to replace Justice Stevens.150 Yet again, concerns over judicial activism echoed among conservative critics.151 Both of President Obama’s nominations were monumental, as democrats had gone fifteen years without a Supreme
Court appointment. 152 Moreover, compositional changes generally reflect the appointing President’s policy preferences, which “shift the ideological composition of the bench to bring it into line with what they
feel is popular sentiment.” 153
By 2011, the majority of Americans, fifty-three percent, “believe[d]
same-sex marriage should be recognized by the law” and given all “the
same rights as traditional marriage.” 154 Another poll showed that
Americans “opposed DOMA by [fifty-one] percent to [thirty-four] percent.” 155 Thus, in less than two decades, support for same-sex marriage
nearly doubled from twenty-seven percent approval in 1996 to fiftythree percent approval in 2011. 156 In May of 2013, a national survey
reported seventy-two percent of Americans thought the legalization of
same-sex marriage was “inevitable.” 157 Interestingly enough, Republicans (seventy-three percent) were just as likely as Democrats (seventytwo percent) and independents (seventy-four percent) to view the legalization of same-sex marriage as inevitable. 158
Just one month later, the Supreme Court decided two landmark
cases for same-sex marriage. The first case, United States v. Windsor,
involved a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA that provided a federal definition of “marriage” and “spouse.”159 Section 3 stated that:
149. Id.
150. Bill Mears et al., Obama Chooses Elena Kagan for Supreme Court, CNN
(May 12, 2010, 10:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/10/scotus.kagan/
[https://perma.cc/KCV3-PUST].
151. Nina Totenberg & Scott Neuman, Kagan Likely to Be Pressed on Writings, Experience, NPR (May 10, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=126657976 [https://perma.cc/P7GP-6KFT].
152. Id.
153. Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual
Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 468 (1997).
154. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage,
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americansfavor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZZ9V-5T4K].
155. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 161.
156. Newport, supra note 154.
157. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as
‘Inevitable,’ PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/in-gay-marriage-debate-both-supporters-and-opponents-see-legal-recognition-as-inevitable/ [https://
perma.cc/R5VQ-SWJG].
158. Id.
159. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who
is a husband or a wife. 160

This section controlled over 1,000 federal laws that addressed marital
or spousal status as a matter of federal law. 161 Notably, the Executive
Branch refused to defend DOMA in this case and had stopped defending its constitutionality in 2011. 162 Ultimately, the Court held, in a 54 decision, that DOMA “imposes a disability on the class by refusing
to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper” and
thus, was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty protected under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 163
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “DOMA’s
unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal
recognition of their marriages.” 164 He went on to list the inequalities
DOMA imposes on same-sex couples, such as healthcare benefits,
bankruptcy protections, and federal financial aid eligibility, by living
as married according to state law but unmarried according to federal
law. 165 Further, Justice Kennedy stated, “DOMA’s principal effect is to
identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal[,] [and] [t]he principal purpose is to impose inequality.” 166 Interestingly enough, Justice Kennedy avoided the question of whether
there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage in his opinion.
Windsor set the stage for lower courts to decide that question independently, leaving the door open for the questions that were ultimately
presented in Obergefell.
It should come as no surprise that the four dissenters were Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for making law in a case “[w]e
have no power to decide” by stating, “[t]he Court’s errors on both points
spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the
160. Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
161. Id.
162. Swathi Nallapa, DOMA: Obama Administration’s Refusal to Defend Law Is Entirely
Justified, MIC (Mar. 29, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/31429/doma-obama-administration-srefusal-to-defend-law-is-entirely-justified#.LUP3lVkF2 [https://perma.cc/Z2A2-GJVE].
163. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695-96.
164. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 2694-95.
166. Id. at 2694.
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role of this institution in America.” 167 He also “accused Justice Kennedy of writing an opinion ‘deliberately transposable,’ in the near future, into a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage.” 168 Justice Alito echoed a similar but less verbose public policy concern, stating, “the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex
marriage. . . . [a]ny change on a question so fundamental should be
made by the people through their elected officials.” 169
The same day, the Court issued its decision in Hollingsworth v.
Perry.170 Hollingsworth involved an amendment to the California Constitution, known as Proposition 8, which provided “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” 171 California law allowed same-sex couples to enter into “domestic partnerships,” which carried “the same rights, protections, and benefits,
and . . . [were] subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and
duties under law” as marriage. 172 Proposition 8 did not take those
rights away, but “reserve[ed] only ‘the official designation of the term
“marriage” for the union of opposite-sex couples as a matter of state
constitutional law.’ ” 173
The Court declined to address the constitutionality of Proposition 8
because it found the petitioners lacked Article III standing to invoke
the power of a federal court. 174 Chief Justice Roberts explained there
was no injury to redress here: “[T]he District Court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the state officials named as defendants from enforcing it . . . . and the state officials chose not to appeal.” 175 Nor can a private party seek relief for a generalized grievance
on behalf of the State.176 The Court stated, “[w]e have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of
a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline to
do so for the first time here.” 177

167. Id. at 2697-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Klarman, supra note 10, at 158 (quoting Windsor , 133 S. Ct. at 2710
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
169. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).
170. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
171. Id. at 2659 (quoting CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.5).
172. Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004)).
173. Id. at 2659-60 (quoting Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009)).
174. Id. at 2668.
175. Id. at 2662.
176. See id. at 2667.
177. Id. at 2668.
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By May of 2015, a record high of sixty percent of Americans supported the legalization of same-sex marriage. 178 Roughly one month
later, the issue of same-sex marriage came before the Court once again
in Obergefell v. Hodges.179 Thus, in just two years, the Supreme Court
decided a total of three same-sex marriages cases, as opposed to the
seventeen years it took to decide Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence, all of
which involved gay rights issues but not same-sex marriage directly.180
Obergefell involved challenges to Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee law, all of which defined marriage as a union between one
man and one woman. 181 The question before the Court was whether
these states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same-sex
couples “the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.” 182 Soon to be known
as “the Court’s great gay rights champion,” Justice Kennedy once
again wrote for the five-member majority. 183 In a landmark decision,
the Court held that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.” 184 Thus, just the
same as opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples have the fundamental
right to marry in all states. 185

178. Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage,
GALLUP (May 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-supportsex-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/X9N4-BB8F].
179. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
180. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-91 (1986) (upholding a Georgia sodomy statute by finding no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy in the Due Process
Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 633 (1996) (holding Colorado’s Amendment 2,
which prohibited all state legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships” unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling
Bowers, finding homosexual adults’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their [sexual] conduct without intervention of the government”).
181. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 at 2593.
182. Id.
183. Nathan Goetting, Gay Marriage Is a Fundamental Right, 70 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV.
137, 141 (2013).
184. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. Justice Kennedy’s use of the Equal Protection Clause
is interesting here because he arguably could have reached the same result by simply relying
on the fact that there is a substantive due process right for same-sex couples to marry. Once
the Court determines there is a substantive due process right, the right is removed from the
legislative process. Obergefell’s seemingly unnecessary equal protection discussion is significant because it begs the question of whether same-sex couples are now considered a suspect
class under the Equal Protection Clause, which this Author plans to address in a separate
piece.
185. Id. at 2607.
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The Court reasoned that it has long held the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. 186 Marital status provides an
expansive list of government rights, responsibilities, and benefits, so
denying same-sex couples of the same legal recognition afforded to opposite-sex couples “would disparage their choices and diminish their
personhood.” 187 Justice Kennedy reasoned the fundamental right to
marry is both a matter of history and ancient tradition but also rises
“from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” 188 He went
on to say that new societal understandings about our most fundamental institutions (e.g., marriage) could reveal inequality that was once
unnoticed and unchallenged. 189 The history and tradition, namely discussing marriage in personal terms, is much different than the history
and tradition Justice Kennedy relied on in Windsor. Justice Kennedy
discusses what marriage means to individuals, whereas his discussion
of history and tradition in Windsor revolved around federalism and the
rights of states to define marriage themselves.
This decision did not come without fierce dissents from the same four
Justices that dissented in Windsor:190 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. Further, both Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas dissented in Lawrence in 2003 and Romer in 1996.191 The dissents mainly criticized the majority’s decision for being “an act of will”
based on “arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness” rather than legal arguments or judgment. 192 Justice Scalia reasoned that “[j]udges are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers;
whether they reflect the policy views of a particular constituency is not
(or should not be) relevant.” 193 He referred to the Court as “a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine” and criticized the Court
for “violat[ing] a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.”194
Chief Justice Roberts made similar arguments, criticizing the majority’s envisioned role of the Court as “anything but humble or restrained” because “[o]ver and over, the majority exalts the role of the
judiciary in delivering social change.” 195 He reasoned the Court had no
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 2598.
Id. at 2601-02.
Id. at 2602.
Id. at 2603.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696-2720 (2013).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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business deciding whether the institution of marriage should include
same-sex couples because the “Constitution does not enact any one
theory of marriage[;] [t]he people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition.” 196 His dissent ended with “[i]f you are among the many Americans . . . who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. . . . But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had
nothing to do with it.” 197
Thus, in less than three decades, the United States saw substantial
changes in public opinion towards gay rights and same-sex marriage,
with Supreme Court case outcomes paralleling that progress. This
timeline is crucial in establishing the nexus between public opinion
and judicial decisionmaking in this context. Part IV utilizes the attitudinal model to establish this relationship and the attitudinal change
model to provide an explanation for it.
IV. APPLYING A MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING TO THE SAMESEX MARRIAGE CASES
The gay rights and later same-sex marriage cases decided in the
past three decades truly reflect monumental changes in societal opinion about the issues. The timeline laid out in Part III demonstrates the
coinciding progress made both by the American public and by the Supreme Court. Deciphering the relationship between public opinion and
Supreme Court decisionmaking in this context is the next task ahead.
While there is no single theory that provides an all-encompassing explanation for judicial behavior, the attitudinal model, with contextual
support by the attitudinal change model, is the best theory to do so.
It is worth noting that the same-sex marriage cases are unique and
distinguishable from other cases when it comes to analyzing the relationship between the Court and public opinion. Controversies over gay
rights and the legalization of same-sex marriage were and continue to
be highly salient issues both in the eyes of the American public and
before the Court. As of July 2015, two weeks after the Obergefell decision, fifty-eight percent of Americans supported the legalization of
same-sex marriage but forty percent still opposed it; party lines and
age clearly dividing the issue. 198 Additionally, a fractured Supreme
Court decided each of the cases analyzed in Part III, all being either a
196. Id. at 2611.
197. Id. at 2626.
198. Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Stable After High Court Ruling,
GALLUP (July 17, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184217/support-gay-marriage-stable-highcourt-ruling.aspx?g_source=same%20sex%20marriage&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
[https://perma.cc/HWF3-QXWK].
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6-3 or 5-4 decision. The three cases, Windsor, Hollingsworth, and
Obergefell, that specifically addressed same-sex marriage were all decided by a 5-4 margin. 199
Another notable feature is that these cases were decided start-tofinish in less than three decades, a relatively short period of time to
witness a total transformation in the Court’s decisions. It only took the
Court seventeen years to overturn its own decision in Bowers, finding
that state laws banning same-sex sodomy were unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause. 200 Further, the three, and only, Supreme
Court cases that directly analyzed same-sex marriage were decided in
just two years. Therefore, my Part IV analysis is limited to the gay
rights context, and perhaps it is applicable to other civil liberties cases
that come before the Court. But it is not meant to apply to routine and
non-salient Supreme Court decisions.

A. The Attitudinal Model “Plus”
Overall, the best model to fully explain the Court’s decisionmaking
in the gay rights and same-sex marriage cases is the attitudinal model,
with contextual support by the attitudinal change model. I term this
combination the “attitudinal model ‘plus.’ ” The attitudinal model’s
simple hypothesis that “[J]ustices come to the Supreme Court with
their ideological preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual
case facts these preferences cast overwhelming influence on their decision making” 201 proves true in the context of the same-sex marriage
cases. Moreover, “as the Court moves in one ideological direction, it
increases the likelihood that those who share the Court’s policy preferences will be more likely to seek certiorari.” 202 It necessarily follows
that as the Court becomes more liberal, liberal litigants are more
prone to pursue review. 203 Thus, looking at the Court’s composition
and voting alignment is the first step to determining whether the Justices voted ideologically.
In all six of the cases analyzed in Part III, a fractured Court issued
the decisions either 6-3 or, more often, 5-4. A fractured Court is not
always common and does not inevitably mean the Court was split ideologically. In fact, over the past decade, 5-4 decisions made up an average of just twenty-two percent of the Court’s total opinions with an

199. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
200. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
201. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 296 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14).
202. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 6, at 1024.
203. Id.
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average of sixty-seven percent of those 5-4 decisions split ideologically.204 However, when the Justices are ideologically liberal, as were
the five majority members in Windsor and Obergefell, “[t]he odds are
four times higher that the Court will issue a liberal decision.” 205 Further, when the case is politically salient, the odds that the Court issues
a liberal decision are approximately twenty percent higher.206
Out of the three same-sex marriage cases decided by the Roberts
Court, both Windsor and Obergefell had the same alignment of Justices. The five liberal Justices were as follows: Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the majority and the four conservative Justices: Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas dissenting. Out of the
eighty-three 5-4 decisions made by the Roberts Court from the past
five terms (October 2010 to June 2015), twenty-five of those decisions,
including Obergefell and Windsor, were decided by that majority alignment. 207 Thus, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan made up the majority in approximately thirty percent of 5-4
decisions in the past five terms.
A more common alignment is Justice Kennedy with the conservative bloc—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, and
Thomas—the majority in approximately forty-one percent of 5-4 decisions in the past five terms. As the swing vote, “virtually every constitutional question today turns on the vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who is undoubtedly the most powerful [J]ustice in the history of the
U.S. Supreme Court.”208 Thus, with almost any controversial issue before the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy’s vote is usually the deciding
factor, proving that his preferences are of the utmost importance. The
liberal majority alignment in Windsor and Obergefell is telling because those Justices, more often than not, are not the majority in split
decisions, suggesting they voted ideologically here.
The decision in Hollingsworth is an anomaly. In that case, the
Court decided petitioners did not have Article III standing to challenge
California’s Proposition 8 and declined to decide whether the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited California from defining marriage as the
union between one man and one woman. 209 Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan voted in the majority; a 5-4 alignment
204. Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for October Term 2014, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2015),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_Stat_Pack_OT14.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7376-D2XR].
205. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 313.
206. Id.
207. Data compiled from the OT14, OT13, OT12, OT11, and OT10 final stat packs
on Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/
[https://perma.cc/HY4Q-UZXH].
208. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 204.
209. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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that has only happened once (in Hollingsworth) over the Court’s past
five terms. Whether the individual Justices’ ideologies influenced their
vote in Hollingsworth is unclear, but the Court as a whole did not split
ideologically, making it the exception of the same-sex marriage cases.
Another factor that makes the attitudinal model convincing in this
context is that Justice Kennedy authored four of the six cases discussed in Part III. The only two decisions he did not write were Bowers, as he was not yet on the Court, and Hollingsworth, because he
dissented. As previously mentioned, Justice Kennedy’s swing vote is
very significant in controversial cases, generally making his preferences the ones that matter. His ideologies on gay rights are pretty
clear. He authored all the Supreme Court’s decisions supporting gay
rights, authored “an opinion that was remarkably gay-friendly for its
time . . . [a]s a judge on the Ninth Circuit in 1980,” and comes from
northern California, which is “overwhelmingly supportive of gay rights
in general and gay marriage in particular.”210 Justice Kennedy is not
only the swing vote on the Roberts Court but also holds a powerful
position as one of the most senior Associate Justices.
One of the most important Supreme Court procedures is the process
of majority opinion assignment. After hearing oral arguments on a
case, the Court “holds a secret conference to discuss the case and cast
tentative votes based upon any number of factors including their ideological predilection, argument advanced by direct and indirect parties,
and logic underlying the solicitor general’s position on the case.”211 After the vote, if the Chief Justice voted with the majority, he or she
assigns the opinion. 212 If not, the most senior Associate Justice in the
majority assigns the opinion. 213 “[R]esearch suggests that [C]hief
[J]ustices and other majority opinion assigners typically reserve cases
high in salience for themselves.” 214
In both Windsor and Obergefell, Justice Kennedy was the most senior Associate Justice that voted in the majority and accordingly, assigned both opinions to himself. 215 This position gave him “substantial

210.
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213.
214.

KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 205.
Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 298.

Id.
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Id. at 298-99 (citing Saul Brenner, The Chief Justice’s Self Assignment of Majority
Opinion in Salient Cases, 30 SOC. SCI. J. 143-50 (1993); David J. Danelski, The Influence of
the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in AMERICAN COURT
SYSTEMS—READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 496 (Sheldon
Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978); Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the Burger Court, 67 JUDICATURE 299, 299-304 (1984)).
215. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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agenda control over the content of the opinion” and did in fact “determine[] the future direction of law and policy” in regard to same-sex
marriage. 216 Consistent with the attitudinal model, self-assignment allowed Justice Kennedy to write opinions that both directly reflected
his own ideological preferences in light of the case facts while also
keeping the majority coalition together.
The first inevitable limitation of the attitudinal model is that it assumes ideological preferences are the primary determinant of the Justices’ behavior. 217 This is an oversimplification of judicial decisionmaking. The Justices’ ideological preferences and values may play a large
role in some cases, like the same-sex marriage cases, but they certainly
do not explain every case the Court decides. If that were true, every
case would come out 5-4 or however the Court was ideologically split
at the time. In reality, 5-4 decisions are not the norm and not always
ideologically split. While the attitudinal model is not an accurate predicator of every Supreme Court case, the Justices were ideologically
split in every gay rights case dating back to Bowers, with the exception
of Hollingsworth, strongly suggesting their political attitudes influenced their votes. Thus, this limitation does not invalidate my analysis.
The second limitation of the attitudinal model is that it assumes Justices have fixed preferences when they are appointed and these preferences are enduring throughout their time on the bench. 218 However,
Justices are not immune from attitudinal changes, as former Supreme
Court Justice Cardozo emphasized, “[t]he great tides and currents
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass
the judge by.” 219 Further, this assumption fails to “address the link between constitutional design and social or political change” and does not
explain short or long-term change in constitutional law.220 This is where
the attitudinal change model comes in to provide an explanation.
The attitudinal change model suggests, “the observed direct linkage
between public opinion and the behavior of [J]ustices arises from the
force of mutually experienced events and ideas in shaping and reshaping the preferences of both the public and the [J]ustices.” 221 The link
between public opinion and judicial decisionmaking is more indirect
here because the changes in the Justices’ preferences parallel the

216. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 299.
217. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 39, at 171.
218. Id.
219. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 167-78 (1921)).
220. Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1755
(2003) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14).
221. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295.
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changing preferences of the public.222 The attitudinal model did accurately predict the outcomes of the same-sex marriage cases, but the
attitudinal change model provides an explanation for how and why the
Court progressed from Bowers to Obergefell in just three decades.
Changes in public preferences for same-sex marriage happened
fairly drastically during this time. In 1996, only twenty-seven percent
of Americans supported legalization of same-sex marriage, whereas
sixty percent of Americans supported it in 2015.223 What could account
for the changes in public attitudes regarding same-sex marriage?
First, there have been large changes over the past decade in terms of
favorable opinions of gay men and lesbians overall. 224 In 2003, thirtyseven percent of Americans reported viewing gay men favorably, while
fifty-one percent viewed them unfavorably. 225 Similarly, thirty-nine
percent of Americans reported viewing lesbians favorably, while fortyeight percent viewed them unfavorably. 226 However, by 2013, by a
fifty-four percent to sixteen percent margin, more Americans had a favorable than unfavorable opinion of gay men, and by a fifty-eight percent to nineteen percent margin, about twice as many Americans
viewed lesbian women favorably than unfavorably. 227
Additionally, the largest factor in the approval or disapproval of
same-sex marriage is whether the individual knows someone who is
gay or lesbian. 228 When the Court decided Bowers in 1986, Justice
Powell discussed the case with his gay law clerk and remarked that he
had never known a gay person.229 At that time, only twenty-five percent of Americans reported having a gay friend, coworker, or relative. 230 By 1993, three years before the Court decided Romer, sixty-one
percent of Americans polled as personally knowing someone that identified as gay or lesbian. 231 Further, in 2013 when the Court decided
Windsor and Hollingsworth, nearly nine out of ten Americans (eightyseven percent) personally knew someone who was gay or lesbian.232
222. Id.
223. McCarthy, supra note 178.
224. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as
‘ I nevitable,’ supra note 153.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Laura Dean, The Struggle for Legitimacy of Same-Sex Marriage and Public Opinion
of Same-Sex Marriage (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Washington University), http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/897918260.html?FMT=ABS.
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The link between these relationships and attitudes about homosexuality is strong. That same poll also revealed that roughly two-thirds
(sixty-eight percent) of Americans who know a lot of people who are
gay or lesbian favor gay marriage, compared to thirty-two percent of
those who do not know anyone. 233
Like the American public, Supreme Court Justices are also “social
beings confronted with the plethora of stimuli emanating from American culture, media, and politics.” 234 Over the past three decades, the
Justices were simply not immune from these same social forces that
lead the public to become more accepting of same-sex marriage. Before
the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsburg spoke at the University of
Minnesota Law School and “marveled at the ‘remarkable’ shift in public perception of same-sex marriage that she attribute[d] to gays and
lesbians being more open about their relationships.”235 A few months
later, she stated in an interview “I think that as more and more people
came out and said that ‘this is who I am,’ the rest of us recognized that
they are one of us.” 236 Further, in 2014, Justice Kagan officiated a
same-sex wedding for her former law clerk and his husband. 237 Thus,
from Justice Powell not even knowing a gay person (or knowing his
law clerk was gay) in 1986, to Justice Ginsburg speaking out and Justice Kagan acting in support of same-sex marriage in 2014, the Court’s
progress from Bowers to Obergefell goes beyond just the Justices’ ideologies. Over time, the same social forces that swayed public opinion
in favor of gay rights in general and eventually same-sex marriage
equally influenced the Court as a whole.

B. Revisiting the Legal Model and Strategic Behavior Model
Although scholars have largely abandoned the legal model, which
calls for impartial decisionmaking based on the merits, devoid of any
expression of judicial individuality or ideology, it nonetheless finds little
support in the context of the same-sex marriage cases. Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell exemplify
the type of legal analysis that is filled with both judicial individuality
233. Id.
234. Flemming & Wood, supra note 153, at 471.
235. Associated Press, Ginsburg Talks Gay Marriage, POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2014,
9:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/supreme-court-gay-marriage-ruth-baderginsburg-111032 [https://perma.cc/6SBJ-UJ9P].
236. Paige Lavender, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Americans Wouldn’t Need ‘a Large Adjustment’
to Welcome Legal Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/12/ruth-bader-ginsburg-gay-marriage_n_6669000.html.
237. Sam Frizell, Here’s What 5 Supreme Court Justices Have Said About Gay
Marriage, TIME (Jan. 16, 2015), http://time.com/3672426/supreme-court-gay-marriage-justices/
[https://perma.cc/Y6A5-VBKS].
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and ideology. His reasoning in those cases emphasized social policy, notions of fairness, and dignity, as compared to strictly relying on the plain
language of the Constitution. More significantly, Justice Kennedy used
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to broaden the
scope of fundamental rights by embracing a vision of a living Constitution, which sharply conflicts with the legal model.
Specifically, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy “embraced an interpretive methodology of living constitutionalism, which construes the
open-ended language of the Constitution according to evolving social
mores rather than the original understandings of its authors.” 238 He
echoed this sentiment in his two following opinions. In Windsor, he
stated that recognizing the validity of same-sex marriages performed
in the United States “reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its
evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.” 239 Two years later
in Obergefell, he reasoned that the fundamental right to marry was an
ancient tradition and arose in this context “from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty.”240 He
went further to say that new societal understandings about our most
fundamental institutions, specifically marriage, could reveal inequality that was once unnoticed and unchallenged. 241
Praised by some and sharply condemned by others, Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in these cases simply does not lead to case outcomes
based purely on the legal merits and neutral principles that the legal
model demands, nor should it. The most difficult and controversial
cases come before the Supreme Court for a reason; they require that a
complex multitude of factors be considered. Despite this, the legal
model still portrays judges as scientifically applying the applicable
rule of law, which leaves little room for discretionary authority and no
room for judicial individuality. While the Court, and specifically Justice Kennedy, cited to precedent and constitutional provisions in the
same-sex marriage cases, those explanations are not necessarily the
reasons underlying the decision. Rather, judicial ideology and individuality flourished in those cases, providing little to no support for the
legal model in this context.
While slightly more persuasive than the legal model, the strategic
behavior model also fails to find support in the same-sex marriage
cases. This theory suggests “the Court directly and deliberately follows
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public opinion for fear of losing its legitimacy as an institution.” 242 Public opinion serves as an active constraint on the Justices’ preferences
here. 243 The Justices do not underestimate the importance of public
opinion in retaining the Court’s legitimacy and functionality as an institution. However, the strategic behavior model overemphasizes the
effect this plays on judicial decisionmaking by suggesting the Court
directly and deliberately follows public opinion for this reason.
In the gay rights and same-sex marriage cases, the progressiveness
of public opinion and the Court’s decisions were never far off from each
other. The timelines arguably coincided because of mutually shared
experiences and ideas that shaped and reshaped the public and the
Court’s opinions. However, there was no direct causal relationship either way. When the Court decided Lawrence in 2003, it was inevitably
moving towards the question of legalizing same-sex marriage, yet only
thirty-two percent of the public favored legalizing same-sex marriage
with fifty-nine percent opposing it. 244 Even when the Court decided
Windsor and Hollingsworth in 2013, public approval of legalizing
same-sex marriage was hovering right above fifty percent. 245 Further,
all of the Court’s gay rights decisions leading up to Obergefell suggested same-sex marriage legalization would be the outcome. The
Court decided Obergefell based on its own principles set forth in Windsor and the strong influence of ideological preferences, not because it
feared losing its institutional legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION
As one of the most socially, politically, and legally contentious issues in the United States, the progressive changes in public opinion
and Supreme Court decisionmaking regarding same-sex marriage in
recent years is truly remarkable. It reflects broader concepts about democracy, the judiciary, and the Constitution. As explained by Justice
Frankfurter, “[i]n our scheme of government, readjustment to great
social changes means juristic readjustment. . . . [a]nd so American constitutional law is not a fixed body of truth but a mode of social adjustment.” 246 Consistent with the attitudinal model, the Justices’ ideological preferences cast an overwhelming influence on their decisionmaking in the same-sex marriage cases. Further, over the last three decades, the same social forces that swayed public opinion to gradually
242. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 299.
243. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295.
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accept and support the legal recognition of same-sex marriage equally
swayed the Supreme Court (or at least the majority). The attitudinal
change model completes the explanation for how and why the Court
progressed from its Bowers decision to the monumental Obergefell decision. Thus, I can conclude in this context that the main influence on
the Justices’ vote choice was ideological preferences, but over time and
in the aggregate, the Court indirectly responded to the shifting tides
of public opinion.

